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Notes
MINERAL RIGHTS-SERVITUDES-INTERRUPTION

OF PRESCRIPTION

Plaintiffs conveyed land to defendants on March 29, 1937,
reserving all mineral rights. They executed a mineral lease on
February 26, 1947; the lessee began drilling operations on March
16, under a permit to drill to the Nacatosh strata or zone. Drilling
was discontinued on March 26, when the well reached the Nacatosh depth. By March 28, all drilling equipment had been removed
from the premises. The lessee obtained a permit to deepen the
well, but when he attempted to go back upon the land on April
4, defendants denied admission. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin defendants from interfering with the lessee's attempts to deepen the
well. Held, drilling to the Nacatosh zone did not constitute a bona
fide attempt to obtain production and did not interrupt prescription liberandi causa. However, in view of the lessee's intent to
continue deeper drilling, the court stated: "Plaintiffs should be
permitted to continue their efforts to interrupt prescription by
these drilling operations." McMurrey v. Gray, 216 La. 904, 45 So.
2d 73 (1950).
Louisiana jurisprudence has never recognized the existence
of a separate "mineral estate." The supreme court has consistently
held that any attempt to create such a "mineral estate" will result
only in the creation of a servitude,' subject to ten-year prescription liberandi causa, just as any other servitude. 2 What constitutes interruption of prescription on a mineral servitude? In
Goldsmith v. McCoy, s the court decided that geophysical exploration of land for minerals does not constitute a user sufficient to
interrupt prescription. Successful production of oil or gas is
not required, however; the drilling of a non-producing well in
good faith is sufficient. 4 A non-productive well must be drilled
1. Frost-Johnson Lumber Company v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So.

207 (1922); Wemple v. Nabors Oil Company, 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923);
Lee v. Giauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923).
2. Art. 789, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A right to servitude is extinguished

by the nonusage of the same during ten years." Art. 3546, La. Civil Code of
1870:

"The rights of usufruct, use and habitation and servitudes are lost by

non-use for ten years."

Wemple v. Nabors Oil Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666

(1923); Lee v. Giauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923).
3. 190 La. 320, 182 So. 519 (1938).
4. Hunter Co. v. Ulrich, 200 La. 536, 8 So. 2d 531 (1942); Lee v. Giauque,
154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923).
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to a depth at which there is some reasonable hope of discovering
minerals in paying quantities.5
There are three possible explanations of the holding in this
case. First, the court may have intended to re-define what constitutes a user sufficient to interrupt the ten-year prescription as
the commencement of drilling operations, with the intent to drill
to a depth at which there is a reasonable hope of finding minerals
in paying quantities, along with proof of a good faith effort to
reach such depth.
Only two cases were found which might support such a view,
Keebler v. Seubert,6 a Louisiana Supreme Court case, and Harrison v. Grandison Company,7 a federal district court case. In
Keebler v. Seubert, the drilling continued for a month after the
end of the ten-year period. The court determined that prescription was interrupted, saying, "When these operations began the
ten-year period had not elapsed. There is nothing justifying the
conclusion that the operations were not conducted in good faith." 8
(Italics supplied.) This language implies that the beginning drilling operations is a sufficient user. But plaintiff argued only that
the well did not interrupt prescription because it was a dry hole.
The supreme court had previously ruled several times that actual
production was not required to interrupt the prescription on a
mineral servitude.9 This opinion does not show that plaintiff even
questioned defendant's right to continue drilling operations after
the expiration of the ten-year period; nor does it show that he
raised the issue of the interruption of prescription by the commencement of drilling operations.
In Harrisonv. Grandison Company,'0 where drilling continued for more than three months after the ten-year period expired,
the court simply stated that as long as a good faith use of the
servitude is made within ten years, prescription is interrupted.
Any rule that the commencement of drilling operations is
a sufficient user would be incompatible with the great bulk of
Louisiana jurisprudence. The supreme court has consistently
5. Louisiana Petroleum Co. v. Brousard, 172 La. 613, 135 So. 1 (1931);

Lynn v. Harrington, 193 La. 877, 192 So. 517 (1939); Hunter Co. v. Ulrich, 200
La. 536, 8 So. 2d 531 (1942).
6. 167 La. 901, 120 So. 591 (1929).
7. 51 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. La. 1943).
8. 167 La. 901, 906, 120 So. 591, 592 (1929).

9. Lee v. Giauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923); Wemple v. Nabors Oil
Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923);
Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
10. Ibid.

Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's
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ruled that a user of a mineral servitude involves drilling to a depth
at which minerals in paying quantities may reasonably be expected." In view of the fact that the court clearly and specifically
decided that the well drilled in the McMurrey case was not of a
sufficient depth to interrupt prescription, 12 it did not intend to
sanction the proposition that the interruption of prescription may
be accomplished by the commencement of drilling operations.
A second possibility presents itself. Did the court decide
that a servitude owner who is conducting drilling operations on
the last day of the prescriptive period should be granted a further
period of time in which to attempt to interrupt prescription if he
proves his intention to drill to a reasonable depth? A diligent
search has failed to disclose a single case in which the court took
that position. Except for the Keebler and Harrison cases, in all
previous situations the wells had been completed comfortably
within the ten-year prescriptive period and clearly abandoned
as dry holes.
Neither of these two cases could properly support a proposition which would allow an extension of time to the servitude
owner, since the litigants never argued the issue. In both cases,
the landowner allowed the servitude owner to continue drilling
after the ten-year period was up, and then attempted to deprive
him of the benefit of the time, money, and effort expended in
sinking the well. In other words, the equities of the situation
favored the servitude owners who would have lost a considerable
sum of money and time had the court decided otherwise. Such
is not the situation in the present case, where actual drilling
operations had ceased before the last day of the ten-year period
and the landowner had steadfastly refused to allow further
drilling.
A result which would allow an extension of time to the servitude owner who has not interrupted prescription is undesirable,
and difficult to justify under Louisiana jurisprudence. In the
first place, the land policy of this state is now and always has
been that land should not be tied up for an indefinite length of
time under the burden of a mineral servitude. 1 Second, mineral
11. International Paper Co. v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 202 La. 621,
12 So. 2d 659 (1943); and cases cited in Notes 4 and 5, supra. See especially,
Louisiana Petroleum Co. v. Broussard, 172 La. 613, 135 So. 1 (1931).
12. 216 La. 904, 921, 45 So. 2d 73, 79 (1950).
13. Wemple v. Nabors Oil Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923); Lee v. Giauque,
154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923); and especially Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v.
Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922), where the question is considered
in detail and rejected.
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servitudes are extremely valuable property rights. The protection of such rights demands that the rules governing ownership
of them be certain and definite and that ownership be determined
without the necessity of frequent lawsuits. Third, it would encourage servitude owners to postpone drilling operations until
the end of the prescriptive period. Thereupon the courts would
be called upon to decide such complicated questions as, for example, has sufficient action been taken to use the servitude to
entitle the servitude owner to continue drilling after the expiration of the prescriptive period? If so, how much more time should
be granted? Also, when is the prescription interrupted-as of
the date the ten-year period expired, or as of the date of the completion of the well? Only a court of law would be competent to
determine these issues and others which the application of such
a rule would entail, and, in countless cases, the ownership of
mineral rights would be in doubt for a considerable time pending
litigation.
The remaining explanation of the case is that the supreme
court did not rule on the right of a servitude owner to continue
drilling operations after the terminal day of the prescriptive
period. The briefs submitted provide clear evidence that the
right was not put at issue. Plaintiffs, in their brief, state, "McMurrey could have commenced operations for drilling this well
during the last hour of the ten years.' 1 4 Defendants made this
statement, "The defendants-appellants likewise do not question
the right of. .. [plaintiffs] ... to wait until the last day to go onto
the premises and protect their valuable mineral rights which
were about to expire. . ., '.
The strategy of counsel for plaintiffs was to urge first, that
the drilling to the Nacatosh zone was drilling to a depth at which
minerals could be reasonably expected in paying quantities, and,
if the Nacatosh well did not interrupt prescription, that the lessee
intended to continue drilling if the well was not a producer, and
hence the well was never abandoned. Plaintiffs urged that they
be allowed further time to complete the well to the depth intended.
Defendants attempted to refute both these arguments, but
did not argue that, regardless of intent, plaintiffs were not entitled
to continue operations after the prescriptive period expired.
14. Plaintiff's brief on the merits, p. 11.
15. Defendant's brief on the merits, p. 8.
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The result was that by attempting to prove that McMurrey
did not intend to drill to a deeper zone, defendants impliedly
conceded that if plaintiffs' facts were found to be correct, that is,
if McMurrey did have such intention, then plaintiffs should be
entitled to the relief for which they asked-namely, an injunction
to prevent interference with them while they completed the well.
Finding in plaintiff's favor on the facts, the court naturally
granted the relief asked for, without ruling on plaintiffs' right
to continue drilling after the prescriptive period expired.
It seems that the most satisfactory explanation for the case
is that the question of continuing operations after the expiration
of the ten-year period was not raised and not decided. The issue,
therefore, is still open and needs clarification.
When a case is squarely presented, involving the right of
the owner of a mineral servitude to continue his drilling operations even though the prescriptive period has expired, the court
should properly construe the ten-year prescription non-user
strictly. The jurisprudence has revealed that the policy is strong
against different individuals controlling the various elements of
ownership of the same land by refusing to acknowledge the separate "mineral estate." No preparatory activities, such as exploration, are considered sufficient to interrupt the prescription of a
mineral servitude; there must be an actual drilling of a well. It
is submitted that, although the servitude owner is allowed to use
the servitude at any time within the prescriptive period, a user
of a mineral servitude sufficient to interrupt prescription should
be the drilling of a well, within the limits of the prescriptive
period, to a depth at which there is a reasonable hope of discovering minerals in paying quantities.
A recent act and a recent decision illustrate the trend toward
the very narrow construction of prescriptive periods applicable
to mineral rights. Act 510 of 1950,16 providing that in the case
of mineral or royalty rights the liberative prescription is not suspended or interrupted by minority or other disability, points out
the legislative intent to restrict the prescriptive period to ten
17
years and ten years only. In Union Sulphur Company v. Andrau,'
the terminal day of the prescriptive period on a royalty interest
16. La. R.S. (1950)' 9:5805 reads in part, "The accrual of the liberative
prescription against the ownership, use, or development of minerals, or
mineral or royalty rights shall not be suspended or interrupted because of
the minority or other legal disability of any owner."
17. 47 So. 2d 38 (La. 1950).
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was December 4. Small traces of gas were discovered on November 23, and again on December 2. On December 5, the well began
to flow and by December 7, it had been brought in as a producer.
The owner of the royalty interest contended that the traces found
before December 5 interrupted prescription, even though they
were not in paying quantitiesis until about the 5th. The court
held that prescription was not interrupted and that the royalty
interest was prescribed. Although a royalty interest is not the
same as a mineral servitude, in that actual production is required
in the former, it is submitted that the situation is analogous for
purposes of analysis of the court's view on the prescription of
non-user.
When the question is presented to the court as to whether a
mineral servitude owner, who at the termination of the prescriptive period has not yet completed a well to a depth at which
minerals could reasonably be expected in paying quantities, should
be allowed to continue drilling operations, the court should decide
that the servitude owner is to be judged by what he has accomplished during the prescriptive period-namely, whether he has
drilled to a depth at which there is reasonable hope of minerals
in paying quantities-and not by what he intends to do after the
expiration of the prescriptive period.
JOHN V. PARKER
OBLIGATIONS-AGREEMENTS IN RESTRAINT OF COMPETITION

The vendor of a business contracted not to engage in or
become financially interested in the ready-to-wear business for
three years in the city, nor within a three and a half mile radius
of the location of the business sold, both parties understanding
that the vendor would continue to operate a Five and Ten Cent
Novelty store also owned by him. Held, the vendee was entitled
to an injunction prohibiting the vendor from selling in the Five
and Ten Cent Store any ready-to-wear or dry goods other than
the kind handled when the sale of the ready-to-wear business
was made. Loftin v. Parker,253 Ala. 98, 42 So. 2d 824 (1949).
The decision was based on the lawfulness of the restraint
imposed. Recognizing that contracts in total restraint of trade
18. To interrupt prescription on a royalty interest it is required that there
be actual production of minerals in paying quantities. See Escoubas v. Louisiana Petroleum & Coal Oil Co., 22 La. Ann. 280 (1870); Green v..Standard
Oil Co. of La., 146 La. 935, 84 So. 211 (1920); Daggett, Mineral Rights in Louisiana, § 31 (rev. ed. 1949).

